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PRINTING A WAR IN THREE DIMENSIONS: 
EXPANDING “ARTICLE’’ TO INCLUDE 
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS BEFORE 
THE ITC 
Daniel T. Kane± 
Illegal file sharing for three-dimensional printing will be an aerial assault on 
an already shaken institution, leaving patent law as deeply scarred and infirm 
as copyright following the Napster1 wars. In the early 2000s, the ability to easi-
ly download and share compressed music and audio files online led to funda-
mental changes in copyright utilization, enforcement, and policy.2 Digital tech-
nology, including Napster, allowed for instantaneous, unlimited, and free dis-
tribution of audio, text, and video files. Such technologies deprived copyright 
owners of equivalent revenue from tangible content.3 Similar fundamental 
shifts will occur in patent law if analysts’ predictions regarding three-
dimensional printing come true.4 With the minimization and diversification5 of 
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 1 “Napster was ‘a [peer-to-peer music sharing network] that would allow computer 
users to swap files with one another directly, without going through a centralized file server 
or middleman.’” Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction Of Copyright: Napster 
And The New Economics Of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 263, 264 n.4 
(2002) (citing Karl T. Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, TIME 60 (Oct. 2, 2002)). 
 2 Matthew Green, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing Ser-
vices Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 799 
(2002); see Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 264-65, 320. 
 3 Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 263-64. 
 4 See Ashlee Kieler, 3D Printers: Should They Be in Every Consumer’s Home?, CON-
SUMERIST (Jan. 6, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/01/06/3d-printers-should-they-be-in-
every-consumers-home/ (quoting Jeni Howard, MarketBot Director of Public Relations, on 
the future of 3D printing); see also Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 264 (“Digital technology there-
fore has ‘the potential to demolish a careful balancing of public good and private interest 
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three-dimensional printing,6 analysts predict that in the future, individuals will 
print consumer products using household 3D printers, rather than shipping 
items across state lines or international borders.7 Despite the economic poten-
tial, patent holders are fearful of increasing electronic distribution of digital 
renderings to buyers because of the scars borne by copyright holders.8 Howev-
er, patent law will endure by creating defenses to the impending blitzkrieg. 
Federal courts have been the usual battlefield for intellectual property hol-
ders fighting off infringers, but they are not the hill from which domestic in-
dustries can protect themselves. Section 337 of the 1974 Tariff Act provides 
intellectual property holders with an additional, administrative weapon against 
international infringers importing goods into the United States.9 Generally, 
Section 337 protects domestic industries from any form of unfair competition 
but has predominantly been an arrow in the quiver of mostly intellectual pro-
perty holders.10 
The United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) was created to 
adjudicate cases involving unfair competition under Section 337, including 
importation – by land or by sea – of articles that infringe domestic intellectual 
property rights.11 Traditionally, the equitable remedies of Section 337 have 
been enforced against tangible products infringing valid and enforceable pa-
tents, trademarks, copyrights, and other intellectual property rights conveyed 
by the United States.12 United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
                                                                                                             
that has emerged from the evolution of U.S. intellectual property law over the past 200 
years.’”). 
 5 See, e.g., Timothy Lavin, 3D Printing, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Oct. 2, 2014, 6:05 
PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/3-d-printing (describing product examples 
such as guns, houses, prosthetics, living tissue, phone cases, spare parts, and engine compo-
nents). 
 6 See Kieler, supra note 4 (“The 3D printing industry today is the computer industry of 
the 1980’s.”). 
 7 See id.; Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 271 
Unlike the manufacturing of bottles or books, copying digital information is both in-
expensive and simple. Reduced to ones and zeros, information can be copied by any 
home computer and stored on the hard drive or a CD in minutes or se-
conds….Combined with the Internet, digital reproduction makes it possible for every 
home computer to make and distribute perfect copies worldwide at billions of bits 
per second. 
Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 274 (“Napster’s potential for distributing music 
and the reduced costs of copying represent the dark side of digital technology.”). 
 9 JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REGULA-
TIONS 951 (4th ed. 2002). 
 10 Id. at 951-52. 
 11 See About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 12 Gary M. Hnath, General Exclusion Orders under Section 337, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 349, 350 (2005). 
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have been the soldiers on the front lines, seizing and withholding infringing 
goods that attempt to enter domestic markets through ports or across internati-
onal borders.13 However, electronic transmission of infringing digital data into 
domestic markets via the Internet requires new methods of enforcement against 
unfair competition.14 Just as a saber-wielding cavalry would fend off B-52 
Bombers, the Information Age has left CBP grasping at air. 
“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving 
peace,”15 including peace for intellectual property holders. While preventative 
measures can be taken administratively, legislatively, and judicially, each po-
tential solution is contingent on the statutory construction of the term “arti-
cle.”16 As is commonly the case, the term “article” is statutorily undefined, and 
leaves interested parties to determine whether allegedly-infringing imports fall 
within the ITC’s jurisdiction.17 This Comment contends that the term “article” 
under Section 337 must be proactively defined as inclusive of intangible 
goods, including digital renderings, in response to the significant risks of pa-
tent infringement arising from advancements in three-dimensional printing 
technology. 
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the United 
States International Trade Commission and Section 337 of the 1974 Tariff Act. 
Part I also provides an explanation of three-dimensional printing technology, 
its development, and the rising threat of infringing importation through illegal 
file sharing. Part II provides the legal landscape behind the term “article” under 
Section 337, describing the current interpretations through a recent case before 
the International Trade Commission. Part III provides a statutory interpretation 
of the term “article” through the lens of United States patent law, specifically 
infringement and patent eligibility, and articulates the boundaries of ITC pro-
tections around both tangible and intangible goods. Part IV urges the United 
States to preemptively act through administrative, legislative, and judicial 
means to ensure continued protection of intellectual property rights in the In-
                                                
 13 Id. 
 14 See Ray Ku, supra note 1, at 271 
Digital information can be conveyed without the need for a bottle . . . [as] digital in-
formation can be transmitted through the radio waves of the electromagnetic spec-
trum, as electrical impulses through telephone and cable wires, and as light across 
fiber optic networks with the information alone traveling to the recipient. 
Id. 
 15 GEORGE WASHINGTON, State of the Union Address George Washington January 8, 
1790, in STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES BY GEORGE WASHINGTON 1, 4 (Jim Mannis, ed. 
2003-04), available at 
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/uspressu/SUaddressGWashington.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 16 See 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012) (statutory authorization for administrative rules). 
 17 See id. §§ 1337(a)(4), (m) (noting “article,” missing from statutory definitions). 
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formation Age. Part V summarizes this article’s analysis and re-articulates its 
recommendations. 
I. THE BACKDROP OF CONFLICT 
A. United States International Trade Commission 
The United States International Trade Commission (“ITC” or “Commis-
sion”) is a federal administrative agency independently tasked with the investi-
gation and adjudication of international trade disputes concerning unfair trade 
practices.18 The ITC’s authority creates a “rules-based international trade sys-
tem.”19 Under the 1974 Tariff Act, the ITC has the specific authority to inter-
vene in disputes involving domestic intellectual property rights (i.e. patent, 
copyright, trademark, trade secret, etc.) and allegedly infringing imported 
goods.20 Since the Commission began adjudicating international patent disputes 
in the mid-1970s,21 the agency has prevented various spurious goods from en-
tering domestic markets, ranging from simple toys and pianos to overtly com-
plex semiconductors and video game devices.22 However, not every dispute 
warrants the Commission’s intervention, including when relief is not in the 
nation’s interest.23 
1. Domestic Industry Requirement 
Owners of intellectual property rights are afforded the ITC’s protections on-
ly if they can first establish a domestic industry pertaining to their intellectual 
property exists, or is in the process of being established, within the United 
States.24 Similar to the standing requirements under federal law, the ITC’s do-
mestic industry requirement ensures that the Commission is the proper authori-
ty to resolve the complainant’s injury.25 
                                                
 18 About the USITC, supra note 11. 
 19 Id. 
 20 § 1332(b); see Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(“The ITC is a creature of statute, and must find authority for its actions in its enabling stat-
ute.”). 
 21 Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 233, 240 
(2014). 
 22 See, e.g., Certain Prepregs, Laminates, and Finished Circuit Boards, Inv. No. 337-
TA-659, (Aug. 4, 2012), at ¶1 (Complaint for Enforcement Proceedings under 19 C.F.R. 
210.75). 
 23 See, e.g., § 1337(a)(2). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id. §§ 1337(a)(2)-(3), (d)(2). 
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Section 337 states the Commission will deal with all unlawful importation, 
sale for importation, or sale after importation of any article that infringes a 
valid and enforceable United States patent, or that is “made, produced, pro-
cessed, or mined under, or by means of” a valid and enforceable process pa-
tent.26 But, the Commission does not have authority to deal with any unlawful 
act unless “an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by 
the patent . . . exists or is in the process of being established.”27 
The domestic industry requirement can be dissected into two components: 
an economic prong and a technical prong.28 The former must be demonstrated 
with evidence of significant investment in plants or equipment, significant em-
ployment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in exploitation of the 
intellectual property right (e.g. research and development, engineering, or li-
censing).29 The latter requires a complainant to establish that the purported in-
dustry relates to articles protected by the asserted intellectual property right.30 
If a complainant can satisfy the domestic industry requirement, and can es-
tablish that the imported goods infringe the complainant’s intellectual property 
rights, then the Commission may impose various forms of equitable relief 
against a foreign infringer.31 If the Commission determines that there was a 
violation under Section 337, the Commission can statutorily “direct that the 
articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this sec-
tion, be excluded from entry into the United States.”32 The barricades most of-
ten constructed to repel the advancing infringing imports are exclusion orders, 
general or limited, and cease and desist orders.33 
2. Exclusion Orders 
An exclusion order is a form of injunctive relief instituted by the ITC that 
prevents infringing goods from entering the United States, and is enforced by 
the United States Customs and Border Protections (“CBP”) at the international 
                                                
 26 Id. § 1337(a)(1)(B). 
 27 Id. § 1337(a)(2). 
 28 InterDigital Comm’ns, LLC v. ITC, 707 F.3d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2013); cf. Certain 
Integrated Circuits, Chipsets, & Products Containing Same Including Televisions, Inv. No. 
337-TA-786, Initial Determination at 158 (July 12, 2012) (stating that a separate technical 
prong analysis is not necessary when establishing domestic industry under 19 U.S.C. § 
1337(a)(3)(C)). 
 29 § 1337(a)(3)(A)-(C) 
 30 707 F.3d at 1298. 
 31 See §§ 1337(d)(1), (f)(1). 
 32 Id. § 1337 (d)(1) (establishing that when instituting an exclusion order, the Commis-
sion must examine the order’s potential effects on “the public health and welfare, competi-
tive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers”). 
 33 Hnath, supra note 12, at 350-52, 350 n. 6. 
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borders.34 A general exclusion order broadly prevents all infringing goods from 
entering the United States, while a limited exclusion order applies only to 
goods “manufactured, imported, [or] sold” by the named parties of the preced-
ing ITC litigation.35 
Another form of equitable relief available to ITC litigants is a cease-and-
desist order.36 A cease-and-desist order is “a court’s or agency’s order prohibit-
ing a person from continuing a particular course of conduct.”37 For the ITC, the 
Commission may direct a violator “to cease and desist from engaging in the 
unfair methods or acts involved [in violating Section 337].”38 In the case of 
foreign entity’s unlawful importation of infringing goods, the Commission 
may order the violating foreign entity to cease and desist from importing the 
infringing articles.39 In contrast to exclusion orders, domestic industries may 
seek monetary damages, specifically civil penalties accruing daily, in a civil 
action before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit against parties im-
porting infringing articles in violation of the Commission’s cease and desist 
orders.40 
What is evident from the domestic industry requirement and the equitable 
relief available to successful complainants is the importance of the term “ar-
ticle” as it can preclude industries from ITC protection and prevent effective 
relief against foreign infringers.41 The question of what an “article” is has con-
sistently perplexed practitioners, judges, and even the Commission itself, espe-
cially as technological advancements undermine the enforcement of valid intel-
lectual property rights.42 
                                                
 34 Id. at 350. 
 35 Id. at 351. 
 36 § 1337(f). 
 37 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (10th ed. 2009). 
 38 § 1337(f)(1) (finding that the Commission must examine the cease-and-desist order’s 
effect on “the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States econo-
my, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United 
States consumers”). 
 39 Id. § 1338(b). 
 40 Id. § 1337(f)(2). 
 41 See id. § 1337(a)(1) (noting when an article does not have valid patent, copyright, or 
trademark protection, it may be hard to prove substantial injury to an industry, therefore 
negating effective relief against infringers). 
 42 See Michael Weinberg, What’s the Deal with Copyright and 3D Printing?, INST. FOR 
EMERGING INNOVATION: PUB. KNOWLEDGE 1 (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What’s%20the%20Deal%20with%20Copyright_%2
0Final%20version2.pdf (discussing the need for reexamination of intellectual property 
rights, specifically copyrights, in light of advancements in three-dimensional printing). 
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B. Printing a Fortress: Three-Dimensional Printing Explained 
Three-dimensional printing is a broad term describing manufacturing pro-
cesses that construct physical goods from digital renderings through cross-
sectional layering of materials such as metal, plastic, or even chocolate.43 This 
layering, known as additive manufacturing, can be visualized as a child con-
structing a fort out of blocks, where the child is the printer and the fort is the 
three-dimensional good. The child constructs the fort from the bottom up-
wards, placing a new layer of blocks on top of the previous layer, until the fort 
is completed and will protect against sibling attack.44 In the same fashion,45 
three-dimensional printers construct goods from the bottom upwards, placing a 
new cross-sectional layer of material on the previous layer, until the desired 
product is completed.46 
Just as the hypothetical child requires experiential knowledge or instructions 
for constructing his fort, a three-dimensional printer requires instructions for 
cross-sectional construction of a desired product.47 Digital renderings, com-
monly produced as a computer-aided design (“CAD”) file, are virtual represen-
tations of a physical item and provide the tangible parameters expressed by the 
item, such as size, shape, and material.48 Three-dimensional printers utilize the 
digital rendering as instructions for producing the physical good embodied by 
the virtual representation.49 Because digital renderings are virtual in nature, 
these uploadable files can be distributed to three-dimensional printers on phys-
ical media, such as compact discs or portable flash-drives, or by directly down-
loading files from the Internet.50 
                                                
 43 See 3D Printing Materials: Plastic, Metal, Ceramics and More, SHAPEWAYS, 
http://www.shapeways.com/materials (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (highlighting the different 
metals and types of plastic available for 3D printing); see also Damon Poeter, Hershey 
Shows Off 3D-Printed Chocolate, PCMAG.COM (Dec. 19, 2014, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2473988,00.asp. 
 44 See Lisa Winter, Man Constructs 3D Printed Concrete Castle, IFLSCIENCE! (Sept. 4, 
2014), http://www.iflscience.com/technology/man-constructs-3d-printed-concrete-castle 
(demonstrating that 3D printing is completed in layers). 
 45 3D Printed Clothing Becoming a Reality, RESINS ONLINE (June 17, 2013), 
http://www.resins-online.com/blog/3d-printed-clothing/. 
 46 Jon Excell & Stuart Nathan, The Rise of Additive Manufacturing, THE ENGINEER 
(May 24, 2010), http://www.theengineer.co.uk/in-depth/the-big-story/the-rise-of-additive-
manufacturing/1002560.article. 
 47 Joe Hiemenz, 3D Printing With FDM, STRATASYS, INC. 2, 
http://www.stratasys.com/~/media/Main/Secure/White%20Papers/Rebranded/SSYS_WP_3
d_printing_with_fdm.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 48 See Excell & Nathan, supra note 46. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Hiemenz, supra note 47, at 3 (demonstrating that 3D printing can occur because 
of the opening of a file in special computer software). 
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1. Expansion, Annexation, and Dueling Economic Alliances 
The advantages of three-dimensional printing have not gone unnoticed.51 
Since the 1980s,52 technological advancement in three-dimensional printing has 
expanded in all directions within the commercial void.53 Early versions of 
three-dimensional printers were excessively large, and priced out consumers 
with their sizable costs.54 Yet, three-dimensional printing technology has expe-
rienced minimization55 as well as large-scale application as companies and in-
dividuals appreciate the ability of additive manufacturing to supplant tradition-
al methods.56 Consequently, printable subject matter has simultaneously diver-
sified from predominantly plastic parts57 to full-size cars, edible food, and even 
human tissue.58 
 
2. A Printer in Every Home 
Some predict three-dimensional printers will become a common household 
appliance in similar fashion to the personal computer, where proliferation oc-
                                                
 51 Jane Bird, Exploring the 3D Printing Opportunity, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:39 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6dc11070-d763-11e1-a378-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RBPzSpY8. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Tim Hayes, The Future of 3-D Printing, in OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS 22, 28-29 
(noting both key uses in aerospace, medical and automotive sectors, and an expected growth 
in sales of about $7.6 billion). 
 54 Bird, supra note 51. 
 55 Minimization is a term of art used in the engineering field for the decrease in size, 
shape, and other characteristics as technology progresses toward a favorable, operational or 
commercial result. An example of minimization is the relative decrease in physical size of 
cellular phones from the “brick phones” of the 1980s, to the modern iPhone. Cf. Josh Moor-
croft, Apple Co-Founder Steve Wozniak Claims iPhone 6 Plus is ‘Three Years Too Late,’ 
JBG NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.jbgnews.com/2014/11/apple-co-founder-steve-
wozniak-claims-iphone-6-plus-is-three-years-too-late/225502.html (describing how com-
mercial pressures can cause reversal of minimization, as exampled by the “phablet” indus-
try); Emil Venere, New 3-D Printing Algorithms Speed Production, Reduce Waste, PURDUE 
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.purdue.edu/newsroom/releases/2014/Q4/new-3-d-
printing-algorithms-speed-production,-reduce-waste.html. 
 56 See Bird, supra note 51 (discussing the advantages that companies find in 3D print-
ing). 
 57 See U.S. Patent No. 4,575,330 at [1] (filed Aug. 8, 1984) (issued Mar. 11, 1986) 
(claiming an invention relating to “forming three-dimensional objects from a fluid medium 
and . . . the application of lithographic techniques to production of three-dimensional ob-
jects, whereby such objects can be formed rapidly, reliably, accurately and economically”). 
 58 See, e.g., Stuart Nathan, Building Body Parts with 3D Printing, THE ENGINEER (May 
24, 2010), http://www.theengineer.co.uk/in-depth/analysis/building-body-parts-with-3d-
printing/1002542.article (detailing that, for example, the medical field is using 3D printers 
to create human tissue). 
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curred once computers became affordable.59 The American economy, whether 
or not it has transitioned from manufacturing-based to service-based, relies on 
the physical transportation of goods from suppliers to consumers.60 Prior to 
Internet commerce, consumers obtained products predominantly from local 
establishments, such as groceries or department stores, or from catalogs that 
offered to deliver the item to their home or a local store.61 However, Internet 
consumers are no longer limited to the physical transactions surrounding de-
partment store shopping or mail-order catalogs.62 Today, individuals often in-
teract solely with a corporation’s user interface, place an order online, pay 
electronically, and wait patiently for their package to arrive at their doorstep or 
the local post office.63 
Household three-dimensional printing will drastically alter commercial 
transactions, as consumers will no longer be bound to manufacturers and will 
instead trade directly with suppliers of plastics, metals, and other printable ma-
terials.64 Just as music transitioned from physical delivery on vinyl records or 
compact discs to electronic delivery as digital audio files, manufactured goods 
such as toys, appliances, and even weaponry65 will transition from gradual 
physical delivery to instantaneous electronic delivery as digital renderings used 
                                                
 59 Tom Simonite, Desktop Fabricator May Kick-Start Home Revolution, NEW SCIENTIST 
(Jan. 9, 2007, 5:59 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10922-desktop-fabricator-
may-kickstart-home-revolution.html#.VGX4KlfF_yA; see Alun Anderson, A Whole New 
Dimension: Rich Homes Can Afford 3D Printers, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10105016. 
 60 The Logistics and Transportation Industry in the U.S., SELECTUSA, 
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/logistics-and-transportation-industry-
united-states (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 61 See Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, THE NATION (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168125/amazon-effect (highlighting the rise of Amazon 
and the simultaneous decline of both Barnes & Noble and independent bookstores). 
 62 The Electronic Mall, COMPUSERVE NOSTALGIA, 
http://gsbrown.org/compuserve/electronic-mall-1984-04/ (last updated Apr. 30, 2010). 
 63 See generally Hunter Skipworth, What Happens When You Click Buy on Amazon, 
POCKET-LINT (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/118513-inside-amazon-
fulfilment-centre (detailing the process an item goes through once purchased online). 
 64 See Bird, supra note 51. 
 65 See Michael S. Rosenwald, Weapons Made With 3D Printers Could Test Gun-
Control Efforts, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/weapons-made-with-3-d-printers-could-test-gun-
control-efforts/2013/02/18/9ad8b45e-779b-11e2-95e4-6148e45d7adb_story.html?hpid=z1; 
see also Andrea Ball, Blueprints for 3-D Printer Gun Pulled Off Website, STATESMAN (May 
10, 2013, 1:17 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/blueprints-for-3-d-printer-gun-
pulled-off-website/nXnbG/; see also Natasha Lennard, The Pirate Bay Steps in to Distribute 
3D Gun Designs, SALON (May 10, 2013, 5:11 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/10/the_pirate_bay_steps_in_to_distribute_3d_gun_designs/. 
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in three-dimensional printing.66 For example, instead of an individual ordering 
a new coffeemaker from a wholesale website and waiting days for delivery, an 
individual would purchase the coffeemaker online and promptly download the 
accompanying digital rendering for use with their household three-dimensional 
printer. The benefits to consumers are obvious, but the threats to manufacturers 
are ominous.67 
C. The Powder Keg of 3D Printing 
In the trail of war, you will find thieves with plunder.68 Unfortunately, the 
parallels between the transition of copyrighted materials and the eventual tran-
sition of manufactured products to electronic delivery of goods are not limited 
to the progressive benefits.69 When audio recordings transitioned to digital 
files, thieves began to operate illegal file-sharing services. These file-sharing 
services enabled individuals to illegally download digital files and bypass 
payment to the proprietary owner.70 Analogously, when consumer products 
transition from physical delivery to electronic delivery of a digital rendering, 
thieves will likely begin operating similar file-sharing networks where individ-
uals can illegally exchange digital renderings for popular consumer products, 
bypassing any commercial transaction with the proprietary owner (i.e. the pa-
tent owner).71 
One aspect that is unique to manufactured goods is the ability of foreign en-
tities to independently create identical content.72 In the case of music down-
loads, there was no threat of foreign entities creating identical compositions for 
illegal download in the United States. There was never a Chinese counterfeit of 
popular songs because the content of the download, the performer’s voice, is 
                                                
 66 See generally Rakesh Sharma, Can 3D Reshape Manufacturing in America?, FORBES 
(June 17, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeshsharma/2014/06/17/can-3d-
printing-reshape-manufacturing-in-america/. 
 67 See Liat Clark, Many Retailers Can Legally Force Suppliers to Switch to 3D Printing, 
WIRED UK (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-11/24/andre-
wegner-authentise (noting that retailers can coerce their manufacturers to change their busi-
ness model through digital rights ownership and quality control). 
 68 See Lennard, supra note 65. 
 69 See Chris Fox, Piracy, Printing, and a New Era of Manufacturing, MANUFACTUR-
ING.NET (Aug. 27, 2013, 9:47 AM), http://www.manufacturing.net/blogs/2013/08/piracy-
printing-and-a-new-era-of-manufacturing. 
 70 Illegal File Sharing, YALE INFO. TECH. SERVICES (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
http://its.yale.edu/secure-computing/illegal-file-sharing. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Tim Lince, Innovations Emerge to Pre-empt the Counterfeit Threat of 3D Printing, 
WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (July 4, 2014), 
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=3d5fdade-8639-49d4-984e-
e85eb037a827. 
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unique and incapable of substitution.73 Contrast that with manufactured prod-
ucts, where there is a threat that foreign entities will create identical products, 
especially if the physical dimensions, composition, and assembly are readily 
ascertainable.74 
Copyright law was significantly corrupted by the advent of file-sharing sites 
such as Napster,75 as the lack of preventative measures allowed file-sharing to 
not only become widespread, but even socially acceptable.76 A similar fate 
could befall patent law if preventative measures are not taken, including forti-
fications to prevent the importation of illegal digital renderings for use with 
three-dimensional printers. The war between infringers who electronically im-
port illegal digital renderings and domestic patent holders will be decided 
quickly. 77 Any subsequent battles, however formidable, will be only vain at-
tempts at altering fate through a legal means.78 Thus, the United States must act 
quickly and demonstrate that the ITC has the statutory authority to protect do-
mestic intellectual property rights from unlawful digital renderings imported 
electronically. 
II. ASSASSINATION: FIRST SHOTS FIRED IN THREE-DIMENSIONAL 
WAR 
A. Certain Digital Models 
The scenario of a foreign entity importing infringing digital renderings into 
the United States is not as much fiction as patent-holders would hope.79 In Cer-
tain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, In Making 
Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and 
                                                
 73 See Theodore Giletti, Why pay if it’s free?: Streaming, downloading, and digital mu-
sic consumption in the “iTunes era,” 71 LONDON SCH. OF ECON. ELECTRONIC MSC DISSER-
TATION SERIES 3 (2012) (noting that illegal downloads of music have occurred but failing to 
mention if any counterfeit songs have been produced). 
 74 Lince, supra note 72. 
 75 See Giletti, supra note 73. 
 76 Piracy is Socially Acceptable, New Study Finds, DIGITAL DIGEST (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.digital-digest.com/news-62914-Piracy-Is-Socially-Accepted-New-Study-
Finds.html. 
 77 “The War was decided in the first twenty days of fighting, and all that happened af-
terwards consisted in battles which, however formidable and devastating, were but desperate 
and vain appeals against the decision of fate.” 1914: Fight the Good Fight, ALLAN MALLIN-
SON, http://www.allanmallinsonbooks.com/index.php/1914-fight-the-good-fight/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015) (quoting Winston Churchill). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Lucas Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement and the ITC, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/04/digital-patent-infringement.html. 
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Methods of Making the Same,80 a domestic patent holder (“complainant”) 
sought equitable relief from the ITC against a Pakistani corporation and its 
domestic counterpart (“respondents”).81 The complainant alleged that respond-
ents imported digital renderings to manufacture customized dental aligners, 
and infringed existing United States patents on the aligners, methods of manu-
facture, and digital renderings.82 As alleged in the complaint, the Pakistani cor-
poration created digital data sets for fabricating infringing aligners and these 
data sets were imported and sold to the domestic counterpart.83 
While the question of importation and infringement was easily decided, the 
electronically transmitted data sets posed a more unique question: is digital 
data an “article” under Section 337?84 The significance of this question 
stemmed from the fact that the ITC’s jurisdiction is limited to “articles” that 
infringe a valid and enforceable intellectual property right, or arise from a pro-
tected process, which traditionally has been construed narrowly to include 
solely tangible items.85 While the Commission’s judgment in favor of the do-
mestic patent holder was later vacated by the Federal Circuit on other 
grounds,86 the arguments of the parties and the Staff87 are effective representa-
tions of the conflicting interpretations of “article” under Section 337. 
                                                
 80 Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, In Making Incre-
mental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and Methods of Mak-
ing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, (May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination). 
 81 Id. at 1. 
 82 Id. at 1, 6. 
 83 Id. at 10-11. 
 84 The ITC Has Jurisdiction Over Digital File Transmissions Under Section 337, 
CALDHAM, WICKERSHAM, & TAFT, LLP (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-itc-has-jurisdiction-over-
digital-file-transmissions-under-section-337. 
 85 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(E) (2012). 
 86 Align Tech., Inc. v. USITC, 771 F.3d 1317, n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the Commission has statutory authority 
to exclude the importation of digital data that enters the United States through elec-
tronic transmission. Indeed, the Commission believed that it would have had such 
authority in this case had the Consent Order expressly referenced it. But we take no 
position on whether Section 337 permits the Commission to exclude such importa-
tions. 
Id. 
 87 See generally id. at 1319-21; see also ITC Section 337 Litigation, COOLEY LLP, 
http://www.cooley.com/section337 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (explaining “The Staff” are 
the investigative attorneys of the ITC that may intervene in cases brought before the ITC 
and advocate on behalf of its interests). 
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1. The Complainant: A Board Interpretation of “Article” 
The complainant advocated for a broad interpretation of the term “article,” 
contending that both tangible and intangible goods are within the ITC’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.88 Relying on the Commission’s determination in Certain 
Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof,89 the complain-
ant contended that the ITC had previously held that the term “article” is inclu-
sive of electronically transmitted digital data and relied on the statutory con-
struction adopted in Certain Hardware Logic.90 
a. Certain Hardware Logic 
In Certain Hardware Logic, a domestic patent holder sought enforcement of 
its patents concerning “hardware logic emulation systems and components 
thereof that are used in the semiconductor manufacturing industry to design 
and test the electronic circuits of semiconductor devices.”91 The claimed hard-
ware logic emulation systems comprised hardware and software that tempo-
rarily represented large digital logic networks for designing and testing semi-
conductors.92 The accused products were similar hardware logic emulation sys-
tems and corresponding components, including software that could have been 
electronically transmitted into the United States.93 The domestic patent holder 
sought a permanent limited exclusion order to prevent further importation of 
the foreign emulation systems.94 
The Commission granted equitable relief against the respondents’ software 
and data sets capable of electronic transmission into the United States.95 The 
Commission held that the software and data sets were contributorily infringing 
certain claims of the asserted patents, and granted a cease-and-desist order.96 
                                                
 88 See Certain Digital Models, at 6-7 (citing Certain Incremental Dental Positioning 
Adjustment Appliances, Inv. No. 337-TA-562, Comm’n Op. at 7 (Jan. 23, 2013) and Certain 
Devices for Connecting Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-360, USITC Pub. 2843, Comm’n Op. 
at 9 (Dec. 1994)). 
 89 Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-383, USITC Pub. 2991 (Sept. 1996) (Final). 
 90 See Certain Digital Models, at 7 (citing Certain Set Top Boxes, Inv. No. 337-TA-454, 
USITC Pub. 3564 304-05 (Nov. 8, 2012) (Final)). 
 91 Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-383, at 1 (Mar. 1998) (Op. on Remedy, the Public Interest, and Bonding). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 3. 
 94 Id. at 11. 
 95 Id. at 2-3. 
 96 Id. at 18. The Commission emphasized that Section 337 is not limited to only direct 
infringement of a valid and enforceable patent as the statute does not make any differentia-
tion between direct and indirect infringement; the statute allows the Commission to equally 
react to unfair competition relating to contributory infringement. Id. at 18-19. 
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According to the Commission, “no U.S. customer would purchase the respond-
ents’ emulation system . . . if the customer did not have access to respondents’ 
software, because the system would be inoperable.”97 Thus, the Commission 
issued the order, precluding the importation of any contributorily infringing 
software.98 
Traditionally, CBP officers enforce the Commission’s cease-and-desist or-
ders. Such orders prevent software from entering the United States on compact 
discs or other tangible, magnetic medium.99 However, the respondents’ soft-
ware had the potential to circumvent these traditional protections through elec-
tronic, rather than physical, transmission.100 The Commission stated that “elec-
tronic transmission of the respondents’ software is not substantively different 
from storing the software on a magnetic medium (such as a diskette) and ship-
ping [that] into the United States,” and that remedial orders must target the 
infringing software.101 
b. Align Technology, Inc. v. ITC 
Similarly, the patent holder in Align Technology, Inc. v. ITC asserted that the 
digital data sets of the Pakistani corporation were “articles” under Section 
337.102 According to the patent holder, there is “nothing in the unqualified word 
‘articles’ that inherently narrows the scope of [S] or Section 337.”103 Echoing 
the Commission in Certain Hardware Logic, the patent holder contended that 
the scope of Section 337 is intentionally broad to allow the Commission to 
adapt to technological advancements in media, such as digital data, and meth-
ods of production and distribution, including the Internet.104 Congress intended 
the Commission to protect domestic industry from all kinds of unfair trade 
practices, especially foreign infringement, and “nothing since [the legislation’s 
enactment] indicates any [c]ongressional intent to narrow [the Commission’s] 
remedial authority.”105 
                                                
 97 Id. at 27. 
 98 Id. at 28. 
 99 Id. at 5-6. 
 100 Id. at 5. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, In Making Incre-
mental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and Methods of Mak-
ing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, at 6 (May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination). 
 103 Id. at 7. 
 104 Id. at 7. 
 105 Id. at 7. 
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c. Legislative History: Behind the Tariff Act 
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that the legislative history of Sec-
tion 337 supported the ITC’s actions against the respondents’ electronically 
transmitted software.106 According to the Commission, the 1988 amendments to 
the Tariff Act were intended to “strengthen the effectiveness of Section 337 in 
addressing the growing problems being faced by U.S. companies from the im-
portation of [infringing] articles.”107 The Commission concluded that the statute 
was meant to more effectively “cover a broad range of unfair acts,” and pre-
venting the importation of infringing software through remedial orders was 
well within that purpose.108 Thus, the Commission held that software could be 
fairly defined as an “article” within the context of Section 337 as there was “a 
direct nexus between the respondents importation of their software [via elec-
tronic transmission or otherwise] and [the] infringement of the [asserted] pa-
tents in issue.”109 
2. The Respondent: A Narrow Interpretation of “Article” 
The respondents advocated for a narrow interpretation of “article” under 
Section 337,110 stating that the imported digital data sets were not covered by 
the ITC’s jurisdiction.111 The Federal Circuit’s recent interpretation of the term 
“article” in Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. supported the respond-
ent’s contention that the ITC could not impede importation of their digital data 
sets.112 
a. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In Bayer AG, the patents were directed to “a method of screening for sub-
stances which specifically inhibit or activate a particular protein affecting the 
cultural or morphological characteristics of the cell expressing the protein.”113 
The patented process allows one to determine whether the agent is a protein 
activator or inhibitor by characterizing the level of protein production in the 
                                                
 106 Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems, at 28. 
 107 Id. at 28-29. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-383, USITC Pub. 3089 at 21 (July 31, 1998) (Final). 
 110 Certain Digital Models, at 11. The respondents also contend that the term “importa-
tion” under Section 337 is similarly limited to tangible delivery, barring remedial action 
against electronic transmissions by the ITC. Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 11-12. 
 113 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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cell.114 In response to a declaratory judgment action for invalidity, unenforcea-
bility, and non-infringement by the foreign pharmaceutical supplier, the patent 
holder asserted infringement of its patents pursuant to § 271(g).115 The patent 
holder alleged that the foreign pharmaceutical suppliers imported “the critical 
information, the identification and characterization of a drug, which is made 
[through the] patented process,” and sold of “the drug made by the patented 
process,” and that these actions constituted infringement.116 
Relying on Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceutical, Inc.,117 the respondents 
contended that the Federal Circuit, in construing the term “manufacture” under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), had determined that “article” does not cover digital data 
and other intangible goods.118 Section 271(g) states, “Whoever without authori-
ty imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the Unit-
ed States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States 
shall be liable as an infringer.”119 The patent holder contended that, while the 
drug is clearly a product of the patented process, the critical information is a 
product of the patented process as well.120 Conversely, the pharmaceutical sup-
pliers argued that the term “made” under the statute means “manufactured,” 
and therefore the statute only applies to physical goods produced by a patented 
process.121 
b. Construing What is “Made” 
The court’s analysis centered on the proper construction of the term “made,” 
and whether the term includes intangible goods (i.e. the critical information).122 
Relying on dictionary definitions, the court reasoned the term “made” is a 
verb,123 and therefore, it must refer to “bring[ing] (a material thing) into being 
                                                
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1370. 
 117 See generally id. 
 118 Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, In Making Incre-
mental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and Methods of Mak-
ing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, at 11-12 (May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination). 
 119 Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1371. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1370-71. 
 123 Id. at 1372. The court later stressed the importance of the grammatical characteristic 
of the term “made” as a verb in the statute in rebutting the complainant’s argument that 
“manufacture” cannot be synonymous with “made by” as it would render the term superflu-
ous in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also 340 F.3d at 1373 
(concluding that the term “manufacture” is used as a noun in § 101, and thus is inapplicable 
in the construction of “made” under § 271(g)). 
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by forming, shaping, or altering material.” Therefore, “made” is synonymous 
with “manufactured.”124 
The court subsequently examined other statutory provisions for construction 
of “made.” Based on a related statute from the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 that created § 271(g),125 the court concluded that because 
the term “manufacture” was used to describe the maker of product in another 
provision, this clearly indicated that “made” was intended to mean “manufac-
tured” in § 271(g) as well.126 Similarly, the court examined the statutory excep-
tions under § 271(g). The exceptions specified that if a “product is materially 
changed by subsequent processes” or “becomes a trivial and nonessential com-
ponent of another product,” this does not constitute infringement.127 While the 
complainant argued that the information was itself a product, the court found 
that this interpretation conflicted with the physical transformation infringement 
exception contained in the statute.128 
c. Legislative History: Congressional Intent of 271(g) 
The court’s examination of extrinsic evidence concerning “made” under § 
271(g) also examined the congressional intent underlying the statute.129 Ac-
cording to the court, Congress’ enactment of the statute was influenced by oth-
er infringement remedies, as § 271(g) was enacted “to provide new remedies to 
supplement existing remedies available from the International Trade Commis-
sion (“ITC”) under [Section 337].”130 Congress recognized the insufficiency of 
equitable remedies under Section 337 to protect intellectual property owners 
from the importation of products resulting from patented processes.131 Accord-
ing to a House Report preceding the enactment of § 271(g), “while a domestic 
manufacturer using the patented process would infringe the process patent, a 
foreign manufacturer who imports the product would not [under the current 
patent law].”132 The court interpreted this to suggest that § 271(g) was intended 
to cover the same “articles” falling under the ITC’s jurisdiction, and to create 
                                                
 124 340 F.3d at 1372. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 1372-73 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1)-(2) (2012)). 
 128 Id. at 1373. To conclude that the first exception under § 271(g) requires the physical 
transformation of the product, the court inherently construes the term “materially” to refer to 
the physical composition of the product – instead of the importance of the change to the 
entire product. Id. 
 129 Id. at 1373-74. 
 130 Id. at 1373. 
 131 Id. at 1374; cf. 19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 132 340 F.3d at 1376 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 100-60 at 3 (1987)). 
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additional remedies against foreign infringers.133 However, the court found the 
legislative history devoid of any suggestion “that Congress was concerned that 
the preexisting statutory scheme failed to reach intangible information, or that 
the substantive coverage . . . was to be expanded.”134 When faced with silence 
in the legislative history to the contrary, the court found that interpreting 
“made” any more broadly than covering manufactured, physical articles would 
be improper.135 The court reasoned that interpreting the statue to cover more 
than manufactured goods would “lead to anomalous results” as “[t]he importa-
tion of information [i.e. knowledge that substances are activating or inhibiting] 
in the abstract . . . cannot be easily controlled,”136 especially when knowledge is 
the intangible property of the mind.137 
3. The Court: Digital Data Sets are Clearly Articles 
Despite the respondents’ arguments that “article” should be limited to tangi-
ble products (discussed infra), the Commission held that digital data sets pro-
duced by the Pakistani corporation, and imported electronically into the United 
States, “are clearly articles over which the [ITC] has jurisdiction and authori-
ty.”138 While the Commission’s determination in Certain Digital Models con-
tinued the ITC’s lineage of instituting remedial measures covering electronic 
transmitted data, the Federal Circuit vacated the Commission’s order for im-
proper review and remanded for further proceedings.139 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF “ARTICLE” THROUGH THE 
LENS OF PATENT LAW 
Section 337 prohibits the importation, sale for importation, or sale after im-
portation of articles that “(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States pa-
tent.”140 This romanette helps contain the amorphous collection of goods and 
products within the ITC’s protection.141 The word “infringe” within the trade 
                                                
 133 Id. at 1374. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 1376. 
 136 Id. 
 137 What is Intellectual Property?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 138 Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, In Making Incre-
mental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and Methods of Mak-
ing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, at 18 (May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination). 
 139 See Align Tech., Inc. v. USITC, 771 F.3d 1317, 1326, n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 140 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 141 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (stating statutory con-
struction of an otherwise ambiguous term begins with the language of the statute). 
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statute imputes its own legal meaning upon the otherwise ambiguous term “ar-
ticle” under Section 337.142 Thus, the term “article” under Section 337 can be 
defined within the context of the infringement doctrines codified under § 
271.143 
A. Infringement of a Valid and Enforceable Patent 
Patent infringement, like an enemy’s attacks, can take various forms: direct 
or indirect; literal or equivalent; contributory or induced.144 Given that the 
ITC’s protections are defined by the parameters of the term “article,” the dif-
ferent forms collectively create the perimeter of the ITC’s domestic fortress. 
A patent confers on an inventor the right to prevent another from making, 
using, selling, or offering for sale the fruits of the inventor’s labor, and in-
fringement represents a breach of these rights.145 Conceptually, a patent can be 
viewed as a contract between the inventor and the public (i.e. the public do-
main).146 The public’s agent, the government, offers an inventor a twenty-year 
contract for exclusive production of her invention, in exchange for the inven-
tor’s disclosure of the useful, novel, and nonobvious technology.147 Infringe-
ment is a public citizen’s breach of that contract, entitling the inventor to resti-
tution commonly in the form of monetary damages.148 Similarly, under Section 
337, an imported “article” that infringes a valid and enforceable patent consti-
tutes a breach of the public’s contract with the inventor for sole control of the 
invention’s market.149 
1. Direct Infringement 
The most basic form of infringement is direct infringement, which occurs 
when an individual “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention 
. . . during the term of the patent” without the authority of the patent holder.150 
Direct infringement is established through a comparison of the product with 
the elements of the asserted patent’s claims to determine if the accused product 
                                                
 142 § 1336(h)(1). 
 143 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012). 
 144 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 145 What is IP Law?, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 
http://www.aipla.org/about/iplaw/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 146 Phillip B.C. Jones, Violation of a Patent License Restriction: Breach of Contract or 
Patent Infringement?, 33 IDEA 225, 226 (1993). 
 147 Id. at 225. 
 148 Id. at 226. 
 149 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 150 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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is the patented invention.151 If the accused product embodies all the elements of 
the patent’s claims, then the product directly infringes the patent.152 An accused 
product may embody the patent’s elements literally or equivalently, but if even 
one element is missing in the accused product, infringement cannot be estab-
lished as a matter of law.153 
In the context of three-dimensional printing, direct infringement occurs 
when an individual “prints” a patented product without the patent holder’s con-
sent through either sale, license, or through an illegally downloaded CAD 
file.154 Establishing direct infringement would be quick and painless, as the 
printed product likely embodies the exact patented product portrayed in the 
digital rendering.155 In other words, the individual has produced an article that 
infringes a domestic patent. However, this is only the first instance of in-
fringement in the context of three-dimensional printing.156 
2. Indirect Infringement 
Indirect infringement, unlike direct infringement, enters under the cloak of 
darkness. Indirect infringement often results when an infringer circumvents an 
inventor’s right to restrict the making, producing, and selling of his inven-
tion.157 There are presently two types of indirect infringement:158 contributory 
infringement and induced infringement.159 
a. Contributory Infringement 
Contributory infringement occurs when an individual intentionally provides 
a willful infringer with a component of a patented invention that is a material 
                                                
 151 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 324, (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus., 6th ed. 2012). 
 152 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 153 Patent Infringement, O’BANION & RITCHEY LLP, 
http://www.intellectual.com/infringement.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 154 Davis Doherty, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D 
Printing Revolution, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 353, 354, 356 (2012). 
 155 Id. at 360. This example ignores the potentially exponential possibilities for an illegal 
supplier to alter the digital rendering of a patented product, and the required analysis under 
the doctrine of equivalents that would result in such a scenario. 
 156 See id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. The word “presently” alludes to the concurrently progressing advocacy of Profes-
sors Timothy Holbrook and Lucas Osborn for a third type of indirect infringement, known 
as “digital infringement,” which would aim to combat infringement that utilizes the Internet 
or other digital media. Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringe-
ment in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 
22, 25) (on file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2483550). 
 159 Doherty, supra note 154, at 360. 
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part of the invention, but is not a staple good or commodity.160  Such a compo-
nent does not have any other substantial non-infringing use.161 For example, if 
an unpatented medical device has no other use except in practicing a patented 
process, then the unpatented medical device contributorily infringes the patent-
ed process.162 However, if the medical device has a substantial non-infringing 
use, such as use in an unrelated medical procedure, then the medical device 
does not aid an individual in infringing the patented process.163 Therefore, sup-
plying someone with the medical device would not constitute contributory in-
fringement. 
Contributory infringement allows an inventor to “temporarily extend his 
monopolistic market power to unpatented items used in or with his invention 
since…he is not given a patent in terms over the unpatented items.” Yet, he 
must prevent subversion by those who would facilitate another’s breach of his 
contract with the American public.164 In the majority of cases, contributory in-
fringement involves tangible components that are uniquely tailored for combi-
nation with others to form the patented invention.165 However, the Supreme 
Court has not ruled out that a component within the context of patent infringe-
ment could manifest itself in the form of intangible components, such as soft-
ware.166 
i. Case Study: Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 
In Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corporation,167 telecommunications giant 
AT&T alleged that Microsoft was liable for infringement of their patented 
“apparatus for digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech” under § 
271(f).168 Specifically, AT&T alleged that Microsoft’s Windows operating sys-
tem could enable a computer to practice the patented speech processor after 
installation, in particular installation occurring overseas.169 Section 271(f) pro-
vides U.S. patent holders with protections against foreign infringers who sup-
                                                
 160 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 742 (West, 3rd 
ed. 2009). 
 161 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012); ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 160. 
 162 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 744. 
 163 § 271(c). 
 164 Rohm and Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemcial Co., 599 F.2d 685, 697 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 165 See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Kohler Co., 2006 WL 6005798 (W.D. Wisc. 
2006). 
 166 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 452 n.13 (2007) (“If an intangible 
method or process, for instance, qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ under §271(f) (a question 
as to which we express no opinion), the combinable components of that invention might be 
intangible as well.”). 
 167 Id. at 437. 
 168 Id. at 441-42. 
 169 Id. at 442. 
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ply or cause to be supplied “all or a substantial portion of the components of a 
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in 
part, in such manner as to actively induce” infringement through their combi-
nation outside the United States.170 The Supreme Court found that AT&T’s 
allegations failed under § 271(f) as Microsoft did not actively export copies of 
the operating system from the United States for installation on the accused for-
eign computers.171 
Both § 271(f) and § 271(c), the sections establishing contributory infringe-
ment based on an infringer’s combination of components, domestically or in-
ternationally, used to circumvent a valid and enforceable patent.172 In analyzing 
the software company’s liability for foreign installation of its operating system, 
the Supreme Court had to determine when software (i.e. the operating system) 
constituted a component of a patented invention.173  The Court examined soft-
ware as two, distinct forms174: (1) “the [software] instructions themselves de-
tached from any medium,” or (2) a copy fixed on an “activating medium,” such 
as a compact disc or downloaded Internet file.175 According to the Court, com-
ponents under § 271(f) must be “amenable to combination” or by “other means 
of interfacing with the computer.”176 The operating system in the abstract did 
not qualify, but the Court found that a copy, which included an intangible In-
ternet file, could be a combinable component substantiating a claim of in-
fringement. 177 
                                                
 170 Id. at 445; 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012). 
 171 550 U.S. at 452. 
 172 §§ 271(c), (f). 
 173 550 U.S. at 447 (“This case poses two questions: First, when, or in what form, does 
software qualify as a ‘component’ under § 271(f)? Second, were ‘components’ of the for-
eign-made computers involved in this case ‘supplie[d]’ by Microsoft ‘from the United 
States.’”). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 447-49. 
 176 Id. at 449, 451. 
 177 Id. at 451-52. In the dicta of the majority opinion, the Supreme Court analogized 
software in the abstract to blueprints and other instruments “containing design information, 
e.g., a schematic, template, or prototype.” Id. at 449-50. The Court stated, “A blueprint may 
contain precise instructions [similar to software in the abstract] for the construction and 
combination of the components of a patented device, but it is not itself a combinable com-
ponent of that device.” Id. at 450. The Court further stated that Congress had the ability to 
include “information, instructions, or tools from which those components readily may be 
generated” within § 271(f), but did not. Id. at 451. Comparable to the rate of obsolescence 
for software, this view of blueprints and other information representing the invention entire-
ly will be increasingly regarded as archaic in light of advancements in three-dimensional 
printing. Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 158, at 32. 
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b. Induced Infringement 
Induced infringement occurs when an individual possesses the specific in-
tent to cause another’s direct infringement of a valid and enforceable patent.178 
The requisite affirmative intent of the inducing party can be evidenced by ad-
vertisements or instructions actively encouraging infringement of information 
or a product. The inducing party’s knowledge of another’s direct infringement 
alone is not sufficient to support an induced infringement claim.179 
For example, a hypothetical competing medical device infringes a patent 
when used in a certain application, and is being supplied by a large, corporate 
medical supplier to pediatricians. If the corporation only had knowledge that 
pediatricians were using the medical devices for infringing, unadvertised uses, 
then the corporation is not liable under induced infringement.180 However, if 
the corporation actively encouraged pediatricians to use the medical device in 
an infringing manner through its advertisements, then the corporation may 
have actively induced infringement of the patent by the pediatrician.181 Yet, an 
inducer’s specific intent is inconsequential in proving induced infringement 
unless direct infringement has resulted.182 
i. Case Study: Suprema, Inc. v. ITC 
The direct infringement requirement under § 271(b) nearly caused signifi-
cant impediments to policing indirect infringement under Section 337.183 In 
Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, a foreign importer appealed the Commission’s institution 
of an exclusion order against the importer’s optical scanning devices based on 
their alleged induced infringement of the complainant’s patent.184 The Com-
mission had concluded that the importer had induced a third party to directly 
infringe the complainant’s patent.185 The Commission found the importer had 
the specific intent to induce infringement by willfully blinding itself to the do-
                                                
 178 MERGES ET AL., supra note 151, at 364; ADELMAN, ET AL., supra note 160, at 749, 751. 
 179 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 751; see DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 
1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (detailing the requirements for induced infringement). 
 180 ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 160, at 751 (noting that mere knowledge is not enough to 
support induced infringement). 
 181 The pediatrician is directly infringing the patent when it uses the infringing medical 
device in that certain application protected by the patent. Cf. DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 
1305 (citing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913). 
 182 Hautau v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 179 F.Supp 490, 493 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (“The 
common law of contributory infringement, however, was that there could be no contributory 
infringement to which to contribute or, in other words, without actual infringement.”). 
 183 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, No. 2012-1170, 
2014 WL 3036241 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 1355. 
450 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
mestic patent. Specifically, the importer had emulated the patent holder’s 
products, willfully ignored the third party’s infringing activities, and even en-
couraged the third party’s actions.186 However, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
resulting exclusion order against the importer based on the requirement of di-
rect infringement.187 
The Commission and the Federal Circuit agreed that the importer’s optical 
scanning devices, when combined with the third party’s software, directly in-
fringed the complainant’s claimed method of detecting and qualifying finger-
print images.188 However, this infringing combination did not occur until after 
the optical scanners were imported into the United States.189 An article must 
infringe at the moment of importation for the ITC to issue remedial 
measures.190 The Federal Circuit did not dispute the Commission’s ability to 
impose equitable relief based on direct or indirect infringement.191 However, 
the Federal Circuit vacated the Commission’s determinations regarding the 
patented fingerprint method because the court concluded the Commission 
could not rely on induced infringement without demonstrating the articles di-
rectly infringed at importation.192 
Whether the product of happenstance or foresight, the Federal Circuit has 
vacated the Suprema decision pending a rehearing en banc.193 In Suprema, the 
Federal Circuit, in dicta, expressed its reservations in holding that the ITC can-
not act based upon induced infringement without direct infringement at the 
moment of importation.194 The majority stated that the Commission had been 
left “powerless [by the statute] to remedy acts of induced infringement” by 
Section 337’s ties to importation.195  As Judge Reyna articulated in his partial 
dissent, 
Section 337 is a trade statute designed to provide relief from specific acts of unfair 
trade, including acts that lead to the importation of articles that will result in harm to a 
domestic industry by virtue of infringement of a valid and enforceable patent.196 
Imposition of a strict temporal limitation on Section 337’s intentionally 
broad remedy for intellectual property holders would contradict Congress’ in-
                                                
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 1357. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 1363. 
 191 Id. (detailing that the Commission’s ability to impose equitable relief would not be 
reviewed). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1170, 2014 WL 3036241 *1 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (grant-
ing petition for rehearing en banc and vacating the court’s previous opinion). 
 194 Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, No. 2012-1170, 
2014 WL 3036241 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 195 Id. at 1357. 
 196 Id. at 1372 (Reyna, J. concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). 
2015] Printing a War in Three Dimensions 451 
tent to prevent all unfair acts harmful to U.S. trade.197 As also aptly stated by 
Judge Reyna, there is 
[N]o distinction between importing an article that meets all limitations of an apparatus 
claim as it crosses the border, and actively inducing infringement by importing an ar-
ticle and encouraging another to use that article to practice a patented method.198 
Stated another way, induced infringement should be treated no differently 
than direct infringement under Section 337 as both are unfair trade practices 
harming domestic industries. 
3. Infringement in 3D Printing 
In the context of three-dimensional printing, any contributory or induced in-
fringement is invisible to the naked eye or lies hidden within the shadows.199 
While direct infringement occurs when the patented invention is created by the 
three-dimensional printer,200 indirect infringement occurs prior to production of 
the patented invention.201 In other words, any indirect infringement occurs 
when the patented invention is still only a CAD file on the almost infringer’s 
hard drive or readily accessible through file-sharing services.202 
Arguably, the CAD file contributorily infringes the domestic patent as the 
digital rendering that encompasses the invention’s physical design. The CAD 
file is made especially for the infringer’s direct infringement and has no sub-
stantial non-infringing use as a commodity of commerce.203 Similarly, the CAD 
file is knowingly sold or distributed by the foreign entity with the specific in-
                                                
 197 Id. at 1374-75 (Reyna, J. concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). 
 198 Id. at 1377 (Reyna, J. concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). 
 199 See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 158, at 11) (“[G]iven how diffuse the printers 
may be, it may be difficult for the patent owner to identify who these infringers are.”). 
 200 See id. 
 201 Indirect infringement cannot occur unless direct infringement is caused by or intend-
ed to be caused by the would-be indirect infringer. And because any party liable for indirect 
infringement causes or intends to cause the fabrication by the 3D printer, any instance of 
indirect infringement necessarily precedes the invention coming into being. See Holbrook & 
Osborn, supra note 158, at 12-14, 23 (explaining that patent law offers two forms of indirect 
infringement: active inducement and contributory infringement, illustrating that active in-
ducement requires, among other things, direct infringement and the specific intent to induce 
a third party to infringe, and noting that one requirement for contributory infringement is 
conduct resulting in an act of direct infringement). 
 202 See id. at 12-13 (“[Indirect infringement] liability arises for a party when she facili-
tates the infringement of someone else, such as when a third party makes an infringing item 
from the CAD file.”) 
 203 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) 
(“[Contributory infringement doctrine] exists to protect patent rights from subversion by 
those who, without directly infringing on the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to 
facilitate infringement by others.”). 
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tent to induce the downloading party to directly infringe the domestic patent 
through three-dimensional printing.204 
In both instances of indirect infringement that are illustrated, there is clearly 
an intentional breach of the public’s contract with the inventor.205 Some legal 
scholars have even advocated for the creation of a third type of infringement 
called “digital patent infringement” to specifically combat the “transfer of 
CAD files designed to print the invention.”206 While these scholars believe that 
liability for CAD files under indirect infringement will only provide limited 
coverage from digital infringers, the ITC’s protections under Section 337 are 
merely “informed by U.S. patent law” and should not be subject to the same 
weaknesses.207 
B. Recent Cease Fires in Technological Wars 
In Certain Digital Models, the complainant and the Commission flatly dis-
missed the respondents’ proposed construction of “article” in the context of the 
patentable subject matter under § 101.208 The administrative law judge in the 
case stated that the issue was not whether the asserted patent was valid under 
§101, as that defense was not raised; instead, the issue was “whether or not the 
digital data sets were ‘articles.’”209 Although the Commission was correct that 
the true issue was the construction of “article,” the Commission wrongly 
scorned the opportunity to construe the term “article” using §101 as merely an 
improperly raised defense.210 
                                                
 204 Contributory infringement is the “intentional aiding of one person by another in the 
unlawful making or selling or using of a patented invention.” Pierce Wrapping Mach. Co. v. 
Terkelsen Mach. Co., 300 F. 147, 159 (D.C. Mass. 1924). 
 205 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012); see Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), vacated, No. 2012-1170, 2014 WL 3036241 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 206 See generally Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 158, at abstract. 
 207 Brief for Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 9-10, Suprema Inc. v. ITC, 742 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2012-1170). 
 208 Certain Digital Models Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for use, in Making Incre-
mental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom and Methods of Making 
the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, at 14-15 (May 6, 2013) (Initial Determination) 
It is well settled the scope of section 337 is broad enough to prevent every type and 
form of unfair practice. Software is useful only if it is reduced to an electronic form. 
Consequently, in applying the cease and desist order to respondents’ software when 
it is transferred in electronic form . . ., we are simply preventing the transfer of the 
infringing software in the very [sic] from in which it is executed by the computer. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Id. 
 209 Id. at 20 (“[T]he issue is not whether or not the asserted claims are valid . . . . Rather, 
the question is whether or not digital data sets are articles.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 210 Id. (dismissing the respondents’ arguments relying on § 101 as impermissibly new 
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An accused article can only infringe a valid and enforceable patent if it 
would be itself eligible for patent protections, avoiding issues of novelty, non-
obviousness, and usefulness.211 In other words, an “article” directly infringing a 
patent is, at a minimum, a process, manufacture, machine, or composition of 
matter.212 Such an interpretation of “article” provides the ITC with broad autho-
rity over the vast expanse of patentable subject matter that today includes 
intangible goods.213 While this logical reasoning may seem to place every man-
made good under the Sun214 within the ITC’s jurisdiction, the modern doctrines 
of patent eligibility define a palpable reach for the term “article.” 
1. Patent Eligible Subject Matter 
Patent eligible subject matter under § 101 entails “any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”215 Historically, patentable subject matter has steadily 
progressed from the tangible manufactured goods of the Industrial Age, to the 
business methods and microscopic manufactures descriptive of the Information 
Age.216 However, the flood of technological advancement has often been di-
verted or dammed by judicial interpretations under § 101 aimed at preserving 
the patent system’s integrity.217 
The federal courts have articulated three exemptions under § 101 in an effort 
to protect the “tools of innovation” from monopolization by a single inven-
tor.218 These tools include natural phenomena, laws of nature, and abstract ide-
as, as patenting these would stifle innovation.219 These judicial constructs are 
                                                                                                             
arguments concerning the validity of the complainant’s patents, and inapposite for not de-
termining whether or not software is an article of manufacture). 
 211 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2012) (‘Inventions Patentable,’ ‘Conditions for patentability; 
novelty,’ and ‘Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter,’ respectively). 
 212 Id. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 
invention during the term of the patent thereof, infringes the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
 213 See id. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent . . . .”). 
 214 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979 , 
at 5 (1952)). 
 215 § 101. 
 216 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 601 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 at 309) (“The Court’s prece-
dents provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent-eligibility principles: laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). 
 219 See id. (“Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility to ensure that 
ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
454 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
best explained in the triplet of Benson,220 Flook,221 and Diehr,222 and the quat-
rain of Bilski,223 Prometheus,224 Myriad,225 and Alice.226 
2. The Triplet: 1972 – 1981 
Periodically, the Supreme Court has revisited patent law and attempted to 
remedy perceived glitches within federal jurisprudence, often with multiple, 
closely timed decisions.227 Section 101, as the threshold question for patent 
protections, is often a target of the Supreme Court’s scope.228 When addressing 
patent eligibility concerns in Bilski v. Kappos, the Court redirected analyses 
under § 101 to the judicial exemptions as articulated under three precedential 
guideposts: Benson, Flook, and Diehr.229 
a. Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook 
The first two lines of the triplet arise from attempted claims to mathematical 
formulas that are “abstract intellectual concepts . . . [that] are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”230 In Gottschalk v. Benson, a patent appli-
cant had claimed a method of converting binary-coded decimal numerals into 
pure binary numerals using a mathematical algorithm on a general-use com-
                                                
 220 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 221 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
 222 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 223 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593. 
 224 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 225 See generally Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013). 
 226 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13-298, slip op. at 7-14 (2014). It should 
be noted that there are other cases that have been important to defining patentable subject 
matter under § 101. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1981); State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (1999). 
 227 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); 450 U.S. at 175. These three pivotal patent law cases were decided in a five-year 
span between 1972-1981. See also 561 U.S. at 593; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2107; 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., No. 13-298 at 1. Four more significant patent law decisions took place 
in the five-year span between 2010-2014. 
 228 See, e.g., Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64; see also Parker, 437 U.S. at 588; see also 450 
U.S. at 177. 
 229 Prior to Bilski, the Federal Circuit had advocated use of the Machine-or-
Transformation (“MOT”) test for analyses under § 101. The MOT test requires that for a 
claimed process to be patent-eligible, it must be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593. 
 230 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
2015] Printing a War in Three Dimensions 455 
puter.231 The Supreme Court found the applicant’s claims would cover both 
known and unknown applications of the mathematical algorithm, which the 
Court believed had no other substantial use besides in conjunction with a gen-
eral use computer.232 Similarly, in Parker v. Flook, a patent applicant claimed a 
process for updating the alarm limits233 based on current conditions during cata-
lytic conversion in the petrochemical and oil-refining industry.234 Considering 
the mathematical algorithm as if it were well-known, the Court found the 
claimed process was comparable to an unpatentable claim on solely calculating 
a wheel’s circumference using 2 x pi x radius.235 The Court, however, left the 
gates open for some inventive applications of the judicial exemptions to be 
eligible for patent protections.236 
b. Diamond v. Diehr 
The third and final line of the triplet also arises from a patentee’s claim in-
volving a mathematical algorithm, but concludes with a distinct result.237 In 
Diamond v. Deihr, the Supreme Court’s third guidepost, a patentee attempted 
to claim a “process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured preci-
sion products” using a computer-implemented mathematical algorithm for de-
termining the necessary timeframe.238 The algorithm used in determining the 
necessary time for curing was the Arrhenius equation, a well-known formula 
traditionally used in calculations for rubber-molding processes.239 However, the 
Court concluded that the claimed process was patentable, stating the applicant 
merely sought protections for an inventive process for curing rubber that in-
corporated the Arrhenius equation.240 The Court reasoned that the patentee’s 
claims would only foreclose use of the abstract intellectual concept in conjunc-
                                                
 231 See id. at 64. 
 232 Id. at 68. 
 233 See Parker, 437 U.S. at 585 
An ‘alarm limit’ is a number. During catalytic conversion processes, operating con-
ditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates are constantly monitored. When 
any of these ‘process variables’ exceeds a predetermined ‘alarm limit,’ an alarm may 
signal the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either inefficiency or per-
haps danger. Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but dur-
ing transient operating situations, such as start-up, it may be necessary to ‘update’ 
the alarm limits periodically. 
Id. 
 234 Id. at 586. 
 235 Id. at 595. 
 236 Id. at 594. 
 237 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981). 
 238 Id. at 175. 
 239 Id. at 177 n.2. 
 240 Id. at 192-93. 
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tion with the other claimed steps that transformed the rubber, and was thus 
permissible.241 
3. The Quatrain: 2010 – 2014 
Excluding the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit242 and a handful of major cases addressing equivalence,243 claim con-
struction,244 and business methods,245 all was relatively quiet on the judicial 
front of patent eligibility.  However, in 2009, the Supreme Court began draft-
ing a precedential quatrain of cases to repair § 101 in light of nearly thirty 
years of jurisprudence and technological advancement.246 
a. Bilski v. Kappos 
The first line of the Supreme Court’s recent quatrain demolished the analyti-
cal machinery built by the Federal Circuit for filtering patent eligible subject 
matter.247 In Bilski v. Kappos, an applicant claimed a process for hedging248 risk 
in trading commodities, particularly in the energy industry, that the applicant 
had reduced to a mathematical formula.249 In the underlying case before the 
Federal Circuit, the court had concluded the process was ineligible as it failed 
the machine-or-transformation test, which the court had adopted as the exclu-
sive test for eligibility.250 The Supreme Court maintained that the machine-or-
transformation test was a valuable and important clue in determining eligibility 
under § 101,251 yet concluded reliance on that test was more suited for the In-
dustrial Age, rather than the Information Age.252 
                                                
 241 Id. at 187. 
 242 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 26 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 243 See Warner-Jenkins Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 244 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 245 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (1998). 
 246 Sue D. Nym, What Happened to Judge Lourie in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp?, IP-
WATCHDOG (May 15, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/15/what-happened-to-
judge-lourie-in-cls-bank-v-alice-corp/id=40387/. 
 247 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010). 
 248 Id. at 611 (quoting Judge Rader’s dissent in In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), stating “Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of 
commerce and taught in any introductory finance class”). 
 249 Id. at 599. 
 250 Id. at 604. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 605; see CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (2013), 
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) and aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) 
Bright-line rules may be simple to apply, but they are often impractical and counter-
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As the Supreme Court explicated, inventions are no longer solely “grounded 
in a physical or other tangible form,” but include intangible innovations such 
as “software, advanced diagnostic medicine techniques, and inventions based 
on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation of digital sig-
nals.”253 Thus, the Supreme Court redirected eligibility analysis back to the 
judicial exemptions, highlighting Benson, Flook, and Diehr as important 
guideposts in threshold questions under § 101.254 In balancing the newly-
articulated triplet, the Court concluded the claimed process of hedging risk was 
most similar to the ineligible methods claimed in Benson and Flook, and would 
foreclose a basic concept of commerce from use by other innovators.255 
b. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
The second and third lines of the Supreme Court’s judicial prose addressed 
the patentability of medical advancements.256 In Mayo Collaborative Services 
v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., an applicant claimed a method for determin-
ing the most safe and efficacious dosage of a drug used in treating autoimmune 
disease based on the presence of certain metabolites in the patient’s blood-
stream.257 The claimed method required a physician to (1) administer the drug, 
(2) measure the presence of metabolites, (3) compare measured levels with 
charted levels correlating to the drug’s safety and efficacy, and (4) adjust dos-
age accordingly.258 The Supreme Court held the claimed method was ineligible, 
as the method solely comprised an uninventive application of “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity” to a law of nature, specifically the 
scientific relationship between the metabolite and the drug.259 The Court 
stressed, however, that inventive applications of the judicial exemptions could 
be afforded patent protections, depending on whether the “patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”260 
                                                                                                             
productive when applied to § 101. Such rules risk becoming outdated in the face of 
continual advances in technology—they risk ‘freez[ing] process patents to old tech-
nologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology.’ 
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). 
 253 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605. 
 254 Id. at 609. 
 255 Id. at 611-12. 
 256 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012). 
 257 Id. at 1295. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 1299. 
 260 Id. at 1294. 
458 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 23 
c. Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
The third line depicts the continued struggle between biomedical advance-
ment and the patent system as technology and natural phenomena become in-
creasingly indistinguishable, and illustrates how the Court intends to address 
technology beyond their understanding.261  In Association of Molecular Pathol-
ogy v. Myriad Genetics, an applicant laid claim to isolated DNA segments as 
well as synthetic complementary-DNA (cDNA), each correlating to two hu-
man genes used in detecting individualized risk for breast cancer.262 The Court 
concluded the isolated DNA segments were ineligible natural phenomena 
merely “isolated from the surrounding [natural] genetic material.”263 
Conversely, the Court held the cDNA sequences lacking non-coding in-
trons264 were eligible for patent protections, as “the lab technician unquestiona-
bly creates something new when cDNA is made.”265 According to the Court, 
despite that the claimed cDNA sequences only contained information dictated 
by natural DNA and that genes and their information are unpatentable, the ap-
plicant’s cDNA was “distinct from the [natural] DNA from which it was de-
rived.”266 Thus, the claimed cDNA amounted to significantly more than the 
natural phenomenon itself.267 
d. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
The fourth and most recent line of the quatrain polishes the analytical 
framework the Court has tried to articulate for § 101 with respect to the “law of 
nature” exception to patent eligibility.268 In Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank, an 
applicant claimed a method for mitigating transactional risks surrounding fi-
nancial lending through use of a third party intermediary, where the method 
                                                
 261 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013); see also id. at 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the judgment of the Court, and 
all of its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine 
details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or 
even my own belief.”). 
 262 Id. at 2110-11. 
 263 Id. at 2120. 
 264 DNA is comprised of nucleotide sequences that can be separated into exons and non-
coding introns. Exons correspond to particular amino acids, which are the building blocks of 
proteins. The biological machinery of the cell, specifically ribosomes, use the sequence of 
exons to construct certain proteins. The non-coding introns are the nucleotide sequences of 
the DNA segment that are in between the exons and do not participate in protein synthesis 
as they are removed during the early steps of transcription. See id. at 2111-12. 
 265 Id. at 2119. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (discussing “inventive concept” under § 101). 
 268 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13-298, slip op. at 5 (2014). 
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was implemented on a general-use computer.269 The Court seized the oppor-
tunity to rearticulate the analytical framework presented under Prometheus as 
follows: (1) “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of [the] 
patent-ineligible concepts,” and (2) search for an “inventive concept . . . en-
sur[ing] that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent 
on the [ineligible concept] itself.”270 
Applying the rearticulated framework, the Supreme Court determined the 
claimed method was directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement 
that is a “fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of 
commerce.”271 However, reliance on an abstract idea does not alone render an 
invention ineligible, as “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply [the patent ineligible concepts]” and new and useful applications of those 
concepts are patently eligible.272 The Court ultimately held the method’s reli-
ance on a generic computer and mere application of otherwise conventional 
functions did not amount to an inventive concept that transformed the abstract 
concepts into patentable subject matter.273 
C. The Pentagon: Fortifying Certain Articles with ITC Protections 
Patent infringement and subject matter eligibility provide an otherwise 
amorphous collection of goods and products with five distinct boundaries from 
which to define the perimeter of permissible ITC protection under Section 
337.274 Together, the five sides form a pentagon around the term “article.” 
                                                
 269 Id. at 2-3 
In particular, the claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obliga-
tions between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. 
The intermediary creates ‘shadow’ credit and debit records (i.e., account ledgers) 
that mirror the balances in the parties’ real-world accounts at ‘exchange institutions’ 
(e.g., banks). The intermediary updates the shadow records in real time as transac-
tions are entered, allowing ‘only those transactions for which the parties’ updated 
shadow records indicate sufficient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations.’ At 
the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the relevant financial institutions to car-
ry out the ‘permitted’ transactions in accordance with the updated shadow records, 
thus mitigating the risk that only one party will perform the agreed-upon exchange. 
Id. 
 270 Id. at 7. The second step can also be described as follows: “[W]e then ask, ‘[w]hat 
else is there in the claims before us?’ To answer that question, we consider the elements of 
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the ad-
ditional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. 
 271 Id. at 9. 
 272 Id. at 6. 
 273 Id. at 13-14; Cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3234 (2010) (similarly, the Court 
held that patents directed to an abstract idea are not patentable). 
 274 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(e) (2012) (the statute defines different types of infringements on 
articles). 
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1. Direct and Indirect Infringement 
The first two sides result from two forms of infringement, direct and indi-
rect, as an article must infringe a domestic patent for it to be afforded ITC pro-
tections, specifically those that arise from § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).275 An article di-
rectly infringes a patent if it embodies all the limitations of the claimed inven-
tion, either literally or equivalently.276 Comparatively, an article involved in 
indirect infringement is a component that is either utilized in actively inducing 
another to unlawfully produce the claimed invention, or has no substantial use 
apart from combination with other components to unlawfully form the claimed 
invention.277 While seeking damages for contributory or induced infringement 
based upon certain components may be excessively burdensome or impracti-
cal,278 such considerations are inconsequential in defining “article.”279 
2. Natural Phenomena, Laws of Nature, and Abstract Ideas 
The other three sides result from the judicial exemptions under § 101.280 For 
an article to infringe a valid and enforceable patent, the article must itself be 
eligible for patent protections.281 The judicial exemptions further confine the 
amorphous collection of goods in the negative, as “natural phenomena, and 
laws of nature are not eligible for patent protection.”282 Natural phenomena, 
laws of nature, and abstract ideas are not subject to exclusions under Section 
337, as these comprise the “tools of innovation” afforded to all mankind irre-
spective of international borders.283 
Albeit in pursuit of legislative economy, § 101 was meant to be a “dynamic 
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.”284 In the 
beginning, software was predominantly copyrighted as an author’s unique 
composition fixed in a tangible medium, as software was considered nothing 
more than an abstract idea.285 Nevertheless, modern software possessing novel 
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processes or producing unique graphic user interfaces is very commonly af-
forded patent protections.286 Modern patent protections are no longer reserved 
for tangible goods as advancements in technology have produced new, useful, 
nonobvious products unrestricted by physicality.287 
When discussing the patentability of business methods, the Supreme Court 
stated that, “[t]echnology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways,” 
and the courts should not be captive to eligibility standards more suited for the 
Industrial Age, rather than the Information Age.288 Otherwise, the patent system 
would not effectively promote the useful arts and sciences.289 Unfortunately, 
the broad standard under § 101 incidentally created an amorphous landscape 
surrounding patent eligibility that required judicial intervention.290 Similarly, 
the broad nature of the term “article” under Section 337 has created a treacher-
ous battlefield for even the ITC to traverse and requires some form of denota-
tive intervention.291 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommended strategy for combatting the invasion of infringing digital 
renderings into domestic industries comprises three campaigns: administrative, 
legislative, and judicial. 
A. Administrative 
The ITC and CBP will be at the front lines in the coming war between inter-
national digital importers and domestic patent holders, and must be the initial 
focus of any reform effort. 
1. Federal Rule Making 
When creating the modern iteration of Section 337, Congress intended to 
provide the ITC with broad authority in protecting domestic industries’ intelle-
ctual property.292 The previous statute was limited only to manufactured goods 
in domestic industries threatened by substantial injury from unfair import prac-
                                                
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605. 
 289 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 290 2106 Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, supra note 280. 
 291 Id. 
 292 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 
(1988) (the act lays out important definitions describing business and trade). 
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tices and only protected industries relying on investments in factories, equip-
ment, and labor.293 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 expanded ITC protec-
tions to domestic industries that rely on substantial investments in licensing, 
development, and engineering,294 and maintained the statute’s ability to adapt 
to technological advancements by leaving “articles” undefined.295 However, 
ascertaining what is protected under the trade statute cannot be overly burden-
some, as it would be unclear whether domestic intellectual property holders 
with “adequate protection against foreign companies violating such rights.”296 
The ITC should promulgate a rule amending the federal regulations govern-
ing adjudication and enforcement under Section 337 by the ITC.297 The pro-
posed rule should first target 19 CFR § 210.3, which provides definitions for 
ambiguous terms used in the accompanying provisions.298 The proposed lan-
guage should state, “Article means a tangible or intangible good.” Such lan-
guage provides enough ambiguity to allow for efficient adaptation to techno-
logical advancements, while explicitly providing the ITC with authority to po-
lice violations of Section 337 involving digital data. 
The promulgated rule should also amend the federal regulations governing 
the ITC’s pleadings requirements, specifically 19 CFR § 210.12, to reflect the 
expansion of ITC jurisdiction explicitly over digital data. For instance, 
amendment of § 210.3 would require amendment of § 210.12(a)(9), which 
provides the pleading requirements for a complaint based upon infringement of 
a valid and enforceable patent.299 The necessary revision would require a factu-
al showing supporting allegations of contributory infringement involving in-
tangible articles such as digital renderings. The most efficient means for ac-
commodating this change would be to add a new § 210.12(a)(9)(ix) stating, 
When relying on contributory infringement, a showing that each person named as vio-
lating Section 337 of the Tariff Act is importing or selling the article that embodies a 
material part of the invention claimed by the U.S. patent, is not a staple good, and has 
no substantial non-infringing use. 
The subsequent provisions within § 210.12(a)(9) would be renumbered ac-
cordingly. This particular revision to § 210.12(a)(9) accommodates cases in-
volving digital data and ensures adjudicative economy by requiring specific 
information for the administrative law judge at the onset of litigation. Even if 
                                                
 293 H.R. 4848, 100th Cong. (1999), THE LIBR. OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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the ITC’s equitable remedies are unenforceable absent CBP reform, adjudica-
tion by the ITC provides a necessary path for domestic patent holders to subse-
quently seek significant monetary damages against foreign infringers who con-
tinue to engage in unfair trade practices and violate valid and enforceable pa-
tents.300 
2. Collaboration with Internet Service Providers 
CBP can mitigate the necessity for increased litigation by domestic patent 
holders by implementing programs to police electronic transmissions. 301 Unfor-
tunately, due to the virtual nature of digital data, infringing digital renderings 
easily evade CBP officers by lacking a physical anchor such as a compact disc 
or hard drive.302 In the case of the digital renderings, even if the ITC were to 
provide traditional remedies preventing importation of infringing software 
fixed to a tangible medium, these exclusions could be easily circumvented 
through electronic transmission across international borders via the Internet.303 
CBP should collaborate with Internet Service Providers to monitor interna-
tional Internet traffic and enforce exclusion orders against infringing articles 
attempting to enter domestic industries under the radar.  In response to increas-
ing digital piracy of copyrighted materials, especially music and other audio 
recordings, some have advocated for CBP to begin policing electronic trans-
missions via the Internet for pirated digital files.304 While surveillance of Inter-
net traffic by government agencies poses a threat to individual privacy and free 
speech, advocates argue that monitoring Internet traffic has become necessary 
to protect copyright holders given society’s increased reliance on Internet 
pathways for commerce.305 Similarly, a partnership with Internet Service Pro-
viders to monitor international Internet traffic for infringing digital data would 
increase protections for domestic industries against electronically transmitted 
articles infringing valid and enforceable patents.306 Further, to alleviate privacy 
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and free speech concerns, CBP should prevent abuse by concurrently imple-
menting an extensive and transparent oversight procedure comprising explicit 
monitoring limitations, periodic destruction of metadata, and protections for 
accused violators. 
B. Legislative 
An alternative to the administrative actions is congressional action through 
legislation to protect domestic articles.307 For example, § 271(f), an infringe-
ment provision similarly policing circumvention of domestic patents by com-
ponentization, was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corporation.308 In Deepsouth, the Supreme 
Court held that an infringer was not prohibited from making the components of 
a patented deveining machine, and assembling them overseas for subsequent 
sale and use abroad.309 In light of the Supreme Court’s ruling, Congress enacted 
§ 271(f) to “expand[] the definition of infringement to include supplying from 
the United States a patented invention’s components.”310 Similarly, Congress 
should enact legislation in response to another unforeseen form of indirect in-
fringement, specifically circumvention relying on digital renderings. 
1. Proposed Amendment to § 1337(m) 
Mimicking the actions of Congress following the Deepsouth decision,311 
Congress should enact legislation specifically defining “article” under Section 
337 as specifically inclusive of intangible articles. Section 1337(m) currently 
states: 
(m) Definitions 
(1) For purposes of this section and sections 1338 and 1340 of this title, the term 
“United States” means the customs territory of the United States as defined in 
general note 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.312 
To combat infringing digital data and maintain the term’s dynamic proper-
ties, Congress should enact legislation that amends this section to state: 
(2) For the purposes of this section and § 1332, 1336, and 1338 of this title, the 
term “article” shall include intangible goods, such as digital renderings and other 
digital data. 
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Such a statute would be limited to infringing digital data and infringing in-
tangible products, since infringement requirements under Section 337 would 
continue to be imputed on to the term “article.”313 
2. Introduction with Trade Promotion Authority Legislation 
This proposed amendment to Section 337 could easily be included within 
the trade promotion authority legislation currently being debated within Con-
gress.314 The trade promotion authority, or “fast track,” is the ability of the 
President to receive congressional ratification of an international trade agree-
ment without amendment or filibuster in exchange for congressional involve-
ment in negotiations.315 
This authority most recently appeared in the proposed Bipartisan Congres-
sional Trade Priorities Act of 2014 that would renew the trade promotion au-
thority, update negotiating objectives, and strengthen existing U.S. laws.316  
The legislation would specifically include “objectives to facilitate digital trade, 
including through protections for cross-border data flows, and to recognize the 
significance of the Internet in international commerce.”317 
As of May 2015, Congress has not passed legislation providing the Obama 
Administration with trade promotion authority. However, members of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee have been 
collaborating on updated legislation granting trade promotion authority and 
introduced the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability 
Act of 2015 (H.R. 1890), which includes broad trade negotiating objectives 
targeting digital goods and services, as well as cross-border data flows.318 In-
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cluding an amendment to the final bill expanding the definition of article under 
Section 337 to explicitly include intangible goods would facilitate this goal. 
C. Judicial 
According to the Supreme Court, § 101 was meant to be a “‘dynamic provi-
sion designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions’” in concurrence 
with the pursuit of legislative economy.319 When discussing the patentability of 
business methods, the Court stated that, “Technology and other innovations 
progress in unexpected ways,” and the courts should not be captive to eligibil-
ity standards more suited for a different era.320 
Unfortunately, the broad standard under § 101 has incidentally created an 
amorphous landscape surrounding patent eligibility that has been unsuccessful-
ly resolved by the federal courts on multiple occasions.321 Similarly, the broad 
nature of the term “article” under Section 337 has created a treacherous battle-
field for even the ITC’s defending army.322 
1. cDNA as a Template 
In Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Su-
preme Court held naturally-occurring DNA was ineligible for patent protec-
tions under § 101’s natural phenomena exemption.323 However, the Court une-
quivocally stated, “[cDNA] is patent eligible under § 101.”324 Although it 
would be improper “[categorically] denying patent protection for ‘inventions in 
areas not contemplated by Congress [and doing so] would frustrate the purpos-
es of the patent law,”325 the Supreme Court demonstrated affirmative inclusion 
is permissible to provide patent protections for new technologies and maintain 
legislative economy.326 Similar judicial intervention would provide domestic 
industries with coverage from infringing digital data, while maintaining legis-
lative economy. 
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2. Upcoming Opportunities with Suprema, Inc. v. ITC 
The Supreme Court may have the opportunity to actively define article in 
the near future as the Federal Circuit recently reheard Suprema, Inc. v. ITC 
earlier this year.327 The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision will likely provide 
the court’s interpretation of infringing articles under § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) as well 
as the scope of the ITC’s authority over induced infringement.328 If the Federal 
Circuit again finds in favor of the foreign importer, the case could come before 
the Supreme Court and provide the necessary opportunity for judicial interven-
tion. 
Upon granting the petitioner’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court should 
find that the ITC may predicate equitable remedies on findings of induced in-
fringement, including use of intangible goods such as software to create a pa-
tented invention. The Supreme Court should explicitly state that “articles that – 
infringe” under Section 337 includes intangible goods such as software and 
other electronically-transmitted digital data. Similar to the explicit inclusion of 
cDNA by the Court, the explicit inclusion of digital data will provide ITC pro-
tections for intangible technological advancements and maintain the statute’s 
breadth and adaptability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Three-dimensional printing has the potential to be history repeating itself.329 
The Great War was the war to end all wars as it encapsulated all of Europe and 
the majority of the then modern world in armed conflict.330 Dueling alliances 
engaged in territorial and influential expansion, created a powder keg that ig-
nited with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914,331 and re-
sulted in one of the bloodiest wars in modern history.332 However, territorial 
expansion would begin anew and international alliances would resurface with 
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an enamored German people following a charismatic leader.333 Europe, and the 
world, again found themselves at war.334 
The conflicts between domestic patent holders and foreign importers over 
the use of three-dimensional printing to circumvent patents bears striking re-
semblance to the conflicts between file-sharing networks and copyright holders 
at the advent of the Internet.335 Copyright law was significantly corrupted by 
widespread infringement and piracy, and posthumous actions have been noth-
ing but vain appeals at the already-determined fate of copyright.336 
The United States must take preemptive measures through administrative, 
legislative, or judicial means to ensure that domestic intellectual property hold-
ers are protected from the coming invasion of infringing digital data for use 
with household three-dimensional printers. Section 337 arguably covers unfair 
competition involving intangible goods, but administrative and judicial courts 
alike conflict as to the proper scope of the term “article.” The Information Age 
requires that “article” must be interpreted broadly, and as inclusive of intangi-
ble goods electronically transmitted via the Internet. Otherwise, intellectual 
property will find itself in another Great War. 
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